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Abstract 
 The year of 1989 marked a turning point in world history. During the 
last six months of that year, the world witnessed the collapse of communism in 
East-Central Europe. Two years later, communism was abolished in the 
Soviet Union, and that country began to fall apart. These changes were 
stunning and unprecedented in terms of their breadth, depth, and speed. In 
1989, Hungary and Poland led the way, though cautiously. In February of that 
year, the Hungarian communist party leadership officially sanctioned the 
emergence of opposition parties the beginning of the end of the party's 
monopoly of power. In Poland a few months later, after a long series of 
roundtable negotiations between the communist party leadership and the 
opposition, the regime agreed to partially contested elections to the country's 
national legislature. Within the countries of East-Central Europe, the social, 
economic, and political changes were as fundamental as were those in France 
and Russia after their revolutions. In every country in the region the transition 
to Western style parliamentary democracy meant a fundamental restructuring 
of the political system, a proliferation of new interest groups and parties, and 
upheaval within the bureaucracy and administration. At the same time, all of 
these new regimes attempted an economic transition from centrally planned 
economies to market-oriented ones with increasing degrees of private 
ownership of property. Trying to accomplish both of these transitions 
simultaneously, from authoritarianism to pluralism and from plant to market, 
was a huge task, and the two occasionally pulled against each other.  
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Introduction 
 In February 1945, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph 
Stalin got together at the Soviet resort borough/metropolis of Yalta to plan 
the concluding stages of Second World War and to negotiate and settle the 
postwar categorization in Europe. The Anglo-Americans were not in a very 
strong bargaining position for the reason that they had liberated only France, 
whereas the Soviet army had pushed the Germans out of most of Poland, 
Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania and were only about 
100 miles from Berlin (which they would take three months later). Among 
the provisions of the Yalta Agreements, as they came to be known, were the 
movement of Poland's borders some 100 miles westward (leaving parts of 
eastern Poland to the Soviet Union), the division of Germany into occupation 
zones (with the Soviets occupying the eastern part), and the agreement that 
the nations of Eastern Europe were to be democratic and "friendly" to the 
Soviet Union. In an earlier meeting between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow, 
the two had agreed that "Russia" would have predominant influence in 
Romania and Bulgaria and equal influence with the West in Yugoslavia and 
Hungary.  
 In later years Yalta became a symbol of betrayal for many of the 
people in Eastern Europe who felt that the Allies had left Stalin with a free 
hand in the region. Indeed, in the three years following the Yalta 
Conference, the Soviets systematically established Soviet-style communist 
regimes throughout the area. Given the circumstances of 1945, however, it 
was almost inevitable that the Soviet Union would come to dominate 
Eastern Europe. As a result of the postwar military operations the area was 
by then largely under Soviet military occupation, and, by the time of the 
Nazi surrender in May of 1945, it was almost completely so. (Although 
the Russians did not occupy parts of Yugoslavia and Albania, parts of 
Finland and Austria were.) During the war, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the 
Czech lands had been occupied by the Germans; and, in 1940 and 1941, 
Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria had actually sided with the 
Germans by signing the Tripartite Pact (the wartime alliance of; 
Germany, Italy, and Japan). So just as the American, British, and French 
forces swept the Germans out of the western part of Europe and initiated 
Western-style democratic governments in those countries, the Soviets 
occupied Eastern Europe and established "peoples' democracies" that were 
"friendly" to the Soviet Union. Of course, from the Soviet point of view, 
and especially from Stalin's, friendly meant socialist-a capitalist state 
would by nature be hostile to the communism of the Soviet Union. For the 
Soviet Union, furthermore, the lands of Eastern Europe were much more 
important strategically than they were for the West: Most of these lands 
bordered on the Soviet Union; and the region had constituted the principal 
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route of invasion into Russia and the Soviet Union by countless armies, 
including those of Napoleon in 1812 and of the Germans in both world 
wars. Control over the area was of critical importance for the Soviet Union 
but was of marginal interest to the West. The major exception to this 
pattern was in Yugoslavia, where Joseph Broz Tito and the Yugoslav 
resistance managed to liberate the country from the Germans without 
substantial Soviet assistance. [1] 
 
Historical Background 
 In the West at the time, and particularly in the United States, there 
was little inclination to challenge the Soviets on Eastern European Front. 
The United States had just finished a war, after all and the Soviet Union had 
been a collaborator in trounce of Nazi Germany. The United States was 
rapidly demobilizing its troops and bringing them home from Europe. 
Additionally, the Big Three's "Declaration on Liberated Europe" had 
provided that these states would have freely elected governments 
"responsive to the will of the people." In the United States, citizens and 
leaders alike felt that they had done their duty. The last wartime summit, at 
Potsdam in July 1945, provided that the Allies would take reparations only 
from their own zones of occupation. This hardened the division between 
East and West and facilitated the application of the Soviet economic agenda 
in Eastern Europe. 
 Politically, the Soviets were already in the process of extending 
their control into the region, using a procedure that the Hungarian 
communist party chief referred to as "salami tactics" one slice at a time. In 
the earliest stage, in 1945 and 1946, Soviet occupation authorities in each 
of the countries sponsored the formation of coalition governments that 
included both communist and noncommunist parties. In most cases, the 
first parliamentary elections were competitive and fair. In the 1945 
elections in Hungary, for example, the prewar Smallholder's party won 57 
percent of the votes and their leader became prime minister. In the same 
election, the Communist party won only 17 percent of the votes, though they 
did assume some key ministerial posts, such as Interior, which controlled 
the police and security apparatus. These early coalition governments 
pursued reformist policies that were generally welcomed by both the local 
populations and the Western governments: the purging of fascists and 
others who had collaborated with the Nazis; the implementation of social 
reforms, especially agricultural reforms that distributed the land more 
widely; the provision of political freedoms and freedom of expression 
(except criticism of the Soviet Union); and a foreign policy that was 
sympathetic to the Soviet Union and to the West. 
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 During 1946 and 1947, however, these policies were modified and 
the coalition governments were restructured in favor of the communists. 
; Newspapers and media outlets increasingly came under the control of the 
'communists and censorship was imposed. Noncommunist political leaders 
were intimidated, blackmailed, or even assaulted. Party meetings that were 
critical of these actions or of the communists were broken up by the 
communist-dominated Interior Ministry police controlled. Ultimately, new 
parliamentary elections, characterized by intimidation of voters and 
candidates as well as outright fraud, led to new government configurations. 
In the Hungarian elections of 1947, the Smallholder's party this time won 
only 14 percent of the vote, compared to 22 percent for the Communist 
party. The leader of the Smallholders' party, French Nagy, fled the country. 
The next year, the small Communist party was merged with the Social 
Democratic party into the Hungarian Workers' party, which dominated the 
political system for the next thirty years. The pattern was similar throughout 
the region, with the "hodgepodge" of-left-wing parties into a renamed 
Communist party (e.g., the Workers' Party) occurring almost everywhere in 
1948. 
 Although intimidation and force were used to consolidate communist 
power in Eastern Europe, it is important to recognize that there were also 
indigenous sources of support for the communists in most of these countries. 
There were many reasons for this. In Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, 
for example, there had been strong communist parties even before the war. In 
some cases, the communists had played an important role in the wartime 
resistance movement to the Nazis and in the liberation of the country from 
German control. This contributed to popular support for the communists in 
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. (The communists' role in the resistance 
also contributed to widespread support for the Communist party in France 
after the war.) Many people supported the political parties on the left 
because they welcomed their programs for change and social reforms that 
promised economic modernization and the end of the semi feudal prewar 
system. Memories of the economic depression in the interwar period had 
convinced many people that capitalism was in crisis, fostering receptiveness 
(especially among intellectuals) to other approaches, including the Soviet 
system. Finally, there were many people who favored an alliance with the 
Soviet Union, seeing this; the only realistic protection for small countries 
with a history of outside domination. 
 In the early postwar years, as we have seen, Western relations with 
the Soviet Union were reasonably friendly. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin 
regardless of their different approaches in temperament and principles, were 
able to reach a broad consensus on the postwar order in Europe and 
worldwide with the founding of the United Nations. Within five years after 
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the end of the war, though, U.S.-Soviet relations were contemptuous, 
both sides were remilitarizing, and the world was in the throes of the Cold 
War. Many of the causes for this lay in Eastern Europe. 
 
The Western Rejoinder and the Inception of the Cold War 
 The origin of the Cold War is one of the most studied and debated 
issues in U.S. history, and there is an enormous literature on U.S.-Soviet 
relations in the early postwar years.[2] Among Western historians, there 
are two major schools of thought on the origins of the Cold War. The 
traditional interpretation places the blame largely on Moscow, asserting 
that the Soviet Union was intent on expanding its influence and its 
ideology and that the United States had no alternative and surrogate but to 
resist and contain this expansionist tendency and predisposition. The 
revisionist school does not accept the contention that the Soviet Union alone 
caused the Cold War. Some revisionists argue that the United States 
overreacted to a minimal or dubious intimidation and terrorization from 
the Soviet Union. The more radical revisionists place the blame squarely 
on the United States, arguing that an expansionist Unit States was 
attempting to extend its influence worldwide, including into the Soviet 
sphere of influence. Some of the more recent literature combines elements 
of these two schools, producing post revisionist elucidation and 
illumination. 
 To some extent, the revitalization of U.S.-Soviet animosity and 
acrimony after the Second World War was inevitable and foreseeable. The 
two countries were ideological enemies from the time of the 1917 
revolution that brought the communists to power in Russia. Mutual 
distrust and suspicion were reinforced by allied intervention in Russia in 
the early years of Bolshevik (communist) power, the U.S. refusal I to extend 
diplomatic recognition to the new regime (until 1933), and Soviet   
efforts   to   undermine   worldwide   capitalism   through   the Comintern 
(an international organization of communist parries founded by Moscow in 
1919). Even apart from these differences, one would have expected 
tension between these two major powers as they were sucked into the 
power vacuum in Europe created by the Second World War. 
 Both powers were had  intention on trying to avoid a reverberation of the 
war they had just fought, but they had dissimilar conceptions about the 
causes of World War II and the ways to prevent another. From the Soviet 
point of view, this had not been a world war at all, but the Great Patriotic War: 
a fight for survival against German aggression in which the Soviet Union lost 
twenty million lives. For the Soviet Union, the main task was to avoid future 
aggression from the Germans or from other "Western imperialists." This meant 
obtaining control over the Eastern European corridor through which the 
European Scientific Journal July 2015 edition vol.11, No.20  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
270 
Germans had passed twice in the last generation. Such control entailed the 
existence of friendly states in Eastern Europe, which to Stalin meant socialist. 
From the U.S. point of view and particularly from that of President Harry S. 
Truman, the conflict in Europe had come about because of pacification of 
Hitler's aggression, symbolized by the 1938 Munich Agreement, in which the 
Western Allies acceded to Hitler's demands for the Sudetenland region of 
Czechoslovakia. To avoid another war meant to avoid appeasement of 
aggression. When the Eastern European states began one by one to fall under the 
sway of the communists, Truman and the United States saw this as a form of 
Soviet aggression, not unlike that of Hitler in the 1930s. 
 As the lines between the two powers began to harden, both became 
more doctrinaire and less flexible. Visiting Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946, 
former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill said that "an iron curtain has 
descended across the continent" of Europe. In 1947 an important article by 
George Kennan, a State Department official and Soviet specialist, argued that 
the Soviet Union was expansionist by both tradition and ideology, and that 
U.S. policy should therefore be a firm and vigilant containment of Russian 
expansive tendencies. [3] President Truman adopted a similar point of view 
in his March 1947 appeal to Congress for money to support Greece and Turkey: 
"It must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." 
This speech became known as the Truman Doctrine which, along with the 
"containment of communism," became the guiding doctrine of postwar U.S. 
foreign policy.[4] The doctrine was implemented with a series of policies and 
treaties that were meant to establish a bulwark against the further expansion 
of communism in Europe and elsewhere: the Marshall Plan, a commitment of 
$17 billion to promote European economic recovery from the war; the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which extended the U.S. military and 
nuclear umbrella over Western Europe; and the U.S. participation in the 
Korean War (1950-1953) to block the expansion of communism in Asia. 
 The U.S. view of expansionist communism, as expressed by Kennan 
and Truman, was matched by a similarly hostile view of the United States by 
Stalin, and his advisers and associates. At the founding meeting of the 
Cominform (an international organization to coordinate policies among the 
communist states) in 1947, Soviet politburo member Andrei Zhdanov argued 
that U.S. leaders mask their expansionist policy by factious [sic] 
considerations of defense against communism. America's aspirations to 
world supremacy, however, encountered an obstacle in the USSR and in the 
new democracies [i.e., Eastern Europe] which have escaped from the 
control of British and American imperialism. Zhdanov criticized both the 
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan as being parts of U.S. expansionist 
policy.[5] These policies, therefore, were matched by Soviet-sponsored 
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international organizations meant to protect their allies against Western 
expansionism: the Cominform; the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (Comecon, or CMEA); and later the Warsaw Pact the Soviet 
counterpart to NATO. The lines had hardened on both sides of the iron 
curtain 
 
The Institutions of Communism 
 Over the next five years, from 1948 to 1953, the communist 
governments of the region proceeded to establish in their own countries the 
institutions and policies of Soviet-style communism. This was a time of 
very rapid change. The Eastern European states accomplished in five years 
what had taken perhaps twenty years to accomplish in the Soviet Union 
under Vladimir Lenin (1917-1923) and then Joseph Stalin (1920s through 
1953). In part, this was possible because the Eastern Europeans had a ready-
made model based on the Soviet experience, and they simply imitated the 
Soviet pattern in the economic, social, and political spheres. 
 The social policies of the new regimes had elements that were both 
benevolent and oppressive. Like most modernizing governments, and all 
socialist ones, the new governments (even in the coalition phase) seized 
most of the large landed estates and redistributed the property to ordinary 
peasants and farmers. In some areas, for example in the "Western 
Territories" of Poland, newly acquired from Germany, this involved huge 
amount of land. The government's distribution of this property, of ten to 
refugees from farther east, understandably fostered considerable goodwill 
toward the regime. On the one hand, the new communist dominated 
governments also pursued socialist social policies that were often well 
received by the population: subsidized housing, health care education, and 
guaranteed employment. On the other hand, the restrictive apparatus of 
the Soviet state accompanied these generous policies as well: an 
increasingly powerful secret police; restrictions on independent organizations 
and media; and bowdlerization. 
 Economically, each of the Eastern European states pursued the twin 
policies of rapid industrialization and collectivization of agriculture (the 
linchpins of Stalin's first Five-Year Plan begun in 1928). As in the Soviet Union, 
emphasis was placed on heavy industry (metallurgy, machine tools, 
engineering, and petrochemicals) at the expense of light industry and consumer 
goods. The economy could be steered in this direction because of increasing state 
ownership of industry and because of state-controlled central economic 
planning. A state planning agency (modeled on the Soviet Gosplan) worked 
with the Council of Ministers and the various governmental ministries (e.g., 
Ministry of Heavy Industry, Ministry of Metallurgy) to set annual targets for 
growth of national income and gross output of industry, transportation, 
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construction, and agriculture as well as specific output goals for important 
producer and consumer goods. [6] Prices and wages were also fixed by 
government agencies. A central state bank controlled and distributed financial 
and investment resources. The state also regulated foreign trade through a 
Ministry of Foreign Trade. 
 Collectivization of agriculture also followed the Soviet pattern from the 
late 1920s and early 1930s, though the process was not nearly as brutal as in the 
Soviet Union. Two types of socialized farms were established: Collective farms 
were those in which the farmers pooled their land, livestock, and equipment and 
shared in both the work and the proceeds of the farm; state farms, however, were 
owned and operated by the government (through the Ministry of Agriculture), 
and the farmers were simply employees. Employees of state farms had more job 
and income security but were not usually allowed the small private plots for truck 
farming, as were the collective farmers.                                                          
 During the 1950s, most farmland was brought into one of these two in-
stitutions. As in the Soviet Union a generation earlier, there was much resistance 
from private farmers, many of whom had only recently been given land as part 
of the early postwar reforms. The pressure to join the socialized farms was both 
physical and financial. In some countries more than in others, this pressure on 
farmers was more intense, and resistance often led to arrest or deportation. In 
other cases the pressure was subtler. Individual farmers suffered higher taxes 
and had more difficulty acquiring seed and equipment. Furthermore, employees 
of state farms were eligible for government-sponsored health care, vacations, 
and pensions. At any rate, by the early 1960s, most farmland was in the socialist 
sector. The only exceptions were in Poland (where the socialized sector never 
encompassed more than a quarter of the farmland) and Yugoslavia in both 
countries the private sector in agriculture became an important economic 
and political force in later years. 
 The political systems of Eastern Europe were also modeled closely or 
the Stalinist political structure; the institutions even adopted the Soviet) 
names in most cases. As in the Soviet Union, the Eastern Europeans 
adopted a parallel political structure of party and government. Therefore, 
mal-structures of government were constitutionally defined and, in theory 
at least, democratically elected by the population. In practice, in elections to 
state bodies there was only one candidate per seat, and voters simply voted 
for or against the single candidate? Moreover, candidates had to be cleared 
by party authorities at the appropriate level. At the national level, there 
was a national parliament elected by direct popular vote every four or five 
years. The parliament chose from among its members a Council of 
Ministers whose members also acted as the heads of the numerous 
government ministries (many of them economic). The chairman of the 
Council of Ministers, equivalent to a prime minister, acted as head of the 
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government. This pattern of organization was replicated at lower levels, 
down to the city or village, where city councils had chairpersons who had 
powers equivalent to a mayor. 
 This whole structure was paralleled by the communist party 
organization (though, as we have seen, it was often called a "Workers' party," 
as in the Polish United Workers' party). In each country, only about 10 
percent of the adult population belonged to the party, which was 
considered the leading and guiding force in society. At the national level, 
party members elected a party congress every four or five years. Its power 
was largely symbolic in that it met for only a few days, but it did elect 
from its members a Central Committee (usually several hundred 
members), a Political Bureau  (or politburo, ten to fifteen members), 
Secretariat, and a first secretary, who was the national party leader. After 
the early 1950s, at least, the first secretary in most countries was not really a 
dictator; he was the first among equals in a politburo that was the key 
decision-making institution in the political system. 
 The relationship between the party and the state was very close, 
extending even to common membership. The politburo, for example, 
included in its members the top figures in both the party and the state, 
typically including several party secretaries and the most important 
members of the (government's) Council of Ministers (e.g., the minister of 
Defer and the chairman of the State Planning Commission). Furthermore, 
noted above, party executive bodies at each level exercised some control! 
Over the appointment of key persons in the government. A list of those 
positions requiring such clearance was referred to as the nomenklatura, a 
term, which came to describe the political elite itself. Theoretically, though, 
the functions of party and state were to be separate: the party was to 
provide leadership and guidance (and make general policy decisions); the 
government was responsible for policy implementation, administration, and 
day-to-day decision-making. 
 The adoption in Eastern Europe of the institutions and policies of the 
Soviet Union created the Soviet bloc, as it was called in the West. Soviet 
hegemony (influence) over the region was reinforced by a common foreign 
policy of "socialist internationalism" and a series of international or-
ganizations that tied the region together and insured conformity. The first of 
these institutions   was   the   Communist   Information   Bureau, or 
Cominform. At the founding session of the Cominform, in September 
1947, the concept of separate national paths to socialism was condemned 
and the leaders of the people's democracies (as the Eastern European 
communist states were called) were told that their policies and political 
systems should conform to that of the Soviet Union. [7] Beginning in 1948, 
these principles became the basis for a series of purges of Eastern 
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"European communist leaders who were considered too nationalistic in 
their approach. In 1949, Moscow sponsored the creation of the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance, or Comecon, which was meant to coordinate 
trade among the European communist states and to tie them more closely 
together economically. And in 1955, as a response to the West German 
entrance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (which had been 
founded in 1949), the Soviet Union and the people's democracies created 
their own military alliance, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (or the 
Warsaw Pact). With the establishment of these three organizations, 
Cominform, Comecon, and the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern European states became closely integrated politically, 
economically, and militarily, and they became increasingly cut off from the 
rest of Europe. Winston Churchill's statement about the "iron curtain" was 
even truer in 1955 than it was in 1946. 
 
Socio-economic Changes in the Early Years of Communism 
 From the end of World War II through the 1960s, all of the Eastern 
European states experienced high degrees of economic growth and rapid 
social changes. Perhaps the biggest social change was a result of the rapid 
urbanization and industrialization of these countries and the consequent 
decline in the percentage of people living and working in the countryside. 
From 1950 to 1970, all except Albania were transformed from primarily 
rural, agricultural societies to industrial, urban ones. Urbanization 
continued during the 1970s and 1980s. This was also a period of very rapid 
and sustained economic growth throughout the region. The average annual 
rates of growth of the gross national product (GNP), the total value of 
goods and services produced in a country, was above 3 percent for most of 
the countries for most of the years up through the mid-1970s. Very few 
countries historically have experienced such rapid and long-term growth; it 
is even more unusual for a whole region. Even the per capita growth in the 
economy was remarkably high, particularly during the 1950s. 
 There has been much controversy in the West about the meaning of 
this' economic growth in Eastern Europe and about the reliability of the 
data used to calculate GNP growth rates. Many Western economists 
have pointed out that the economies of Western Europe have been much 
more successful and reached much higher levels of development than those 
in Eastern Europe. They also point to the relatively low standard of living of 
Eastern Europeans compared to Western Europeans and to the periodic 
shortages of consumer goods in the East. Such observations are largely 
correct, but they should be balanced with other considerations. First, by and 
large, the Eastern European countries were less developed in the first 
place than those in Western Europe; some might more accurately have been 
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grouped with Third World countries in terms of economic development. 
So these countries had farther to go. Second, the lower standard of living 
in Eastern Europe, in terms of income and consumption is balanced in 
part by higher indicators in other respects: lower (if truth be told, 
negligible) rates of unemployment; broader accessibility (and lesser cost) 
of health care (as measured by physicians and hospital beds per capita); a 
more egalitarian social and economic structure. 
 But even apart from these considerations, the Eastern European 
states held their own in economic development in comparison with other 
states. This was particularly the case during the 1950s and 1960s. A way of 
comparing Eastern European countries, by pairing them with countries at 
similar levels of economic development. As the actualities indicate, in the 
early postwar years (up to 1960), most of the Eastern European countries 
in point of fact gained on the market economies of the West. Seeing that 
the same is also evident from the universal truth already known to 
everybody, the pattern began to change in the 1960s and the Eastern 
European began to fall farther and farther in the rear. This was a key 
factor that led to the reforms in the 1980s and the revolutions in 1989. 
 
Defy and Resist to Communist Orthodoxy 
 By 1948, as we have seen, people's democracies based on the Soviet 
model were established all over Eastern Europe. But even from the beginning, 
the communist bloc was not as monolithic as most Westerners perceived it. The 
first challenge to Soviet domination came from Yugoslavia. Along with Albania, 
Yugoslavia was exceptional in that the Soviet army had played only a minor 
role in liberating it from the Nazis at the end of World War II and had occupied 
only the northern part of the country. The main role in dislodging the Germans 
was played by the Partisans under the direction of the communist leader Joseph 
Broz Tito. Nevertheless, in the early postwar years Tito seemed to be the most 
slavishly Stalinist leader in Eastern Europe and Stalin's most reliable ally. Tito, 
more quickly than any other Eastern European leader, ensconced his 
communist party, purged the country of opposition leaders and parties, and 
embarked on the collectivization of agriculture and on rapid industrialization. 
Partly in recognition of Yugoslavia's model of progress, the Cominform's head-
quarters was established in Belgrade in the fall of 1947. 
 Before 1947 there were already hints of friction between the strong 
willed leaders of the two countries. Stalin had not been pleased with, Yugoslav 
complaints about the behavior of Red Army troops Yugoslavia at the end of 
the war. Tito had refused the Kremlin's offer to establish a joint Soviet-
Yugoslav bank. Stalin was also unhappy with Yugoslavia's support for the 
communists in Greece's civil war and with its efforts to win control over the 
border city of Trieste from Italy. Stalin feared these efforts would complicate 
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Soviet-Eastern European relations with the British and the Americans at a time 
of sensitive postwar negotiations.  
 The major issue at this point was Yugoslav autonomy and sovereignty in 
foreign affairs because domestically Yugoslavia was the most orthodox of 
Eastern European regimes in 1945-1947. Tito and the Yugoslav communists 
were; willing to follow the Soviet lead, but on their own terms. Stalin wanted 
unconditional subordination. This issue came to a head over Tito's efforts in 
1947 and 1948 to establish a Balkan federation that would include Hungary, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia. Stalin rejected Tito's plan and 
instead proposed an alternative, which Tito then rejected. The issue was not so 
much over the federation itself, which both leaders favored in some form, but 
over Tito's right to pursue such regional initiatives without Soviet approval. 
This was the Kremlin's first confrontation with its dilemma of control versus 
diversity, and Stalin opted for the former Stalin was determined to teach Tito a 
lesson and to make of him an example for the rest of the bloc. In the first half of 
1948, Soviet advisers were withdrawn from Yugoslavia, Tito was accused of 
heresy, and, finally, in June the Cominform expelled Yugoslavia from its ranks 
and removed its headquarters from Belgrade. With the implementation of a 
Soviet economic blockade on Yugoslavia, Stalin apparently felt that Tito was 
doomed: "All I need to do is shake my little finger and there will be no more 
Tito," he is quoted as saying. [8] Stalin was wrong. Tito had the support of a 
unified party and much of the population, which viewed him as a war hero. The 
economic blockade was blunted by aid from Western countries, which were 
happy to drive a wedge into the communist bloc. Even worse from the Soviet 
point of view, Tito and the Yugoslav communists proceeded to establish their 
own “separate road to socialism" in the domestic realm, based on extensive dell 
centralization, worker self-management of enterprises, and a mixed market 
economy. The early success of this experiment was a standing rebuke to the 
more authoritarian and centralized Soviet model, and it set a pattern of diversity 
that was to plague the Soviet leadership for the next forty, years. 
 Unable to humble Tito, Stalin turned his frustration on the countries 
that were under Soviet control with a series of anti-Titoism purges. Most of 
these were directed against "home" communists communist leaders who had 
remained in their own countries during World War II and who were therefore 
considered susceptible to "nationalist" predispositions and therefore to 
Titoism. Purge trials of prominent communist leaders took place in 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania. The most.-prominent of 
these trials were in Czechoslovakia; they culminated in 1952 with a spectacular 
trial of former party leader Rudolf Slansky and thirteen others who were charged 
with being "Trotskyite-Zionist-Titoist-bourgeois-nationalist traitors, spies, 
and saboteurs, enemies of the Czechoslovak nation, of its People's Democratic 
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order, and of Socialism."[9] All fourteen were found guilty and eleven were 
hanged. 
  
The Polish Challenge and the Hungarian Revolution 
 Tension between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia eased somewhat af-
ter the death of Stalin in March 1953, and even more so after the new Soviet 
party leader, Nikita Khrushchev, began the process of "desalinization" of the 
Soviet Union. At the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist party in 
February 1956, Khrushchev criticized Stalin and acknowledged that the paths to 
socialism may differ. But even earlier, in May 1955, Khrushchev had visited 
Yugoslavia and signed a communiqué with Tito recognizing the right of 
"national roads to socialism." In April 1956, the Cominform was dissolved. 
Two months later, Tito visited Moscow and signed a joint declaration 
reemphasizing the separate roads principle and reestablishing formal state 
and party relations between Moscow and Belgrade. Khrushchev was 
experimenting with diversity in the bloc, but the consequences were 
unexpectedly troublesome. The death of Stalin and Khrushchev's 
desalinization unleashed wellsprings of frustration and tension throughout 
Eastern Europe. In every country except Yugoslavia, the party leaders in 
1956 were the same people that had come to power in the wake of the anti-
Titoism campaigns. All these "little Stalin’s" therefore were sensitive to the 
criticisms that Khrushchev leveled against Stalin and Stalinism. They were 
also made vulnerable by the Soviet reconciliation with Tito, who also 
continued to criticize Stalinist methods. The apparent liberalization in the 
Soviet Union had resonance in the populations of Eastern Europe as well, as 
people saw an opportunity to voice grievances long suppressed and 
repressed. 
 The first manifestation of unrest broke out in the western Polish city 
of Poznan in June 1956, just one week after Tito's visit to Moscow. The 
Poznan demonstrations against food shortages and poor economic conditions 
became a riot that was brutally put down by Internal Security forces. The 
demonstrations spread to other cities, however, and led to demands for 
political reforms as well. The Stalinist party leader, Boleshiw Beirut, had died 
while attending the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow, and his 
successor, Edward Ochab, expressed sympathy for some of the 
demonstrations and political demands. I finally agreed to step aside in favor 
of Wladyslaw Gomulka, the "home" communist party leader who had been 
purged for his Titoist tendencies in 1948. Khrushchev and other members of 
the Soviet politburo flew to Warsaw in October and were assured by 
Gomulka that Poland would remain communist and within the Soviet 
alliance. Gomulka assumed the party leadership, promising Poles the 
creation of a more "Polish" form of communism; he eased pressure on the 
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Roman Catholic Church, abandoned the collectivization of agriculture, and 
dismissed the Soviet general who was Poland's defense minister. 
 Hungary had also undergone some liberalization since 1953, and in 
July 1956 the Stalinist party leader Matyas Rakosi was replaced as party 
leader. Until the fall, the changes and reform efforts were largely confined to 
the political elite in Hungary. With the October events in Poland, however, 
the impetus shifted to the population, and particularly to students who saw 
the Polish events as the abdication of Soviet domination of the region. 
Demonstrations at the end of October demanded the return to power of the 
"Hungarian Gomulka," the moderate communist and former premier 
Immure Nagy. Young people also toppled the huge statue of Stalin in the 
center of Budapest, the Hungarian capital. As with Poland, members of 
the Soviet politburo flew to the Hungarian capital to supervise the transfer 
of power to Nagy, as prime minister, and Janos khaddar, as party leader. 
Unlike Gomulka, however, Nagy was unable or unwilling to restrain the 
Hungarian revolution, which continues to spread. Some of the old 
noncommunist political parties reemerged, and their leaders were brought 
into Nagy’s cabinet. Nagy began to negotiate for Hungary’s withdrawal 
from the Warsaw Pact and, on November 1, proclaimed Hungary’s 
neutrality. These events were beyond the limits of the permissible for the 
Kremlin, which ordered a military intervention to crush the rebellion. 
Janos Khaddar was put in charge of restoring the communist order; Nagy, 
who had sought temporary shelter in the Yugoslav embassy, was finally 
arrested, tried, and executed in 1958.  
 The crushing of the Hungarian revolution demonstrated that the 
Kremlin would not accept the Yugoslav model elsewhere in the bloc and 
marked a return to the pattern of conformity and control. It also set, 
implicitly at least, the limits to reform in Eastern Europe: maintenance of 
the leading role of the communist party; continued membership in the 
Warsaw Pact; and the maintenance of a dichotomous image of the world 
through the mirror of socialist internationalism. For the rest of the world, 
the Hungarian tragedy also confirmed that Eastern Europe was a Soviet 
sphere of influence. This had been challenged by the United States when 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had pledged earlier to roll back 
communism from Eastern Europe. [10] In the context of the 1950s, this 
was an idealistic approach in foreign policy, but in the end realism 
dominated. There was little the United States could do to help the 
Hungarian freedom fighters on the Soviet doorstep in 1956, and the U.S. 
pledge was revealed as a hollow one. The United Nations was also 
powerless in this case, both because of the absorption of the UN Security 
Council with the Suez Crises (Israel was attacking Egypt at the same time 
Soviet troops were invading Hungary) and because of the Soviet ability to 
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veto any action by the Security Council.  Nevertheless the revolt in 
Hungary also demonstrated how deep the disaffection with communism 
among many Eastern Europeans was and illustrated the limited success of 
the Soviets in grafting the Soviet system onto Eastern Europe. 
 In the early 1960s, there were other signs of fragmentation of the 
Soviet block. Khrushchev’s criticisms of Stalin and his rapprochement 
with Yugoslavia disturbed the more dogmatic communist leaders in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Albania. Ideological, territorial, 
and political disputes between the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong’s China 
became increasingly bitter and open until relations ruptured altogether 
and the Soviets withdrew their economic and military advisers from 
China. At about the same time, Khrushchev severed state relations with 
Albania, which then became the ally and client of the PRC. Meanwhile the 
Romanian party leadership broke with Moscow over a Soviet plan to more 
closely integrate the economies of Comecon. Although Romania remained 
orthodox in terms of its domestic political structure, its foreign policy 
during the 1960s became increasingly independent of Moscow Romania 
reduced its commitment to the Warsaw Pact, refused to allow Warsaw Pact 
maneuvers on its territory, and adopted a neutral stance the Sino-Soviet 
conflict (the conflict between communist China and Soviet Union). 
Writing in 1965, a prominent academic specialist Eastern Europe referred 
to all of this as "the breakup of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe."[11] 
 
The Prague Whorl 
 The next most important and major challenge to communist rule 
and Soviet hegemony came from Czechoslovakia. This country, which had 
been the most economically advanced in Eastern Europe before World War 
II, had suffered more than any other from the wrenching economic 
reorientation under the communists. A steady and sturdy economic 
decline after 1963 made the party leadership more receptive to 
economists' demands for reforms, and a decentralizing market-oriented 
economic reform program was implemented in January 1967. The changes 
in the economic sphere, however only stimulated demands for political 
liberalization and for freedom of expression and debate. The accelerating 
demands for change led the party to replace the conservative party leader, 
Antonio Novotny with the more liberal Slovak Alexander Dubcek. This 
leadership change, much like the accession of Nagy in Hungary in 1956, 
sparked popular expectations for even more substantial changes. Dubcek 
spoke about the creation of” socialisms with a human face," and during the 
spring of 1968, Czechoslovakia was awash with change, inside and outside 
the party. The party's April Action Program attacked the concentration of 
party power and proposed freedom of press, assembly, and travel. In June, 
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advanced censorship of the media was abolished. The party relaxed its 
control over writers and over trade unions, and other organizations. 
 As the Prague Spring progressed, the leadership in the Kremlin and 
also in Czechoslovakia's northern neighbors, Poland and the Germany 
Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) became increasingly 
alarmed with the pace of change and with the possibility of transnational 
infection. A July meeting of the Warsaw Pact members warned that 
Czechoslovakia's affairs were not purely internal, and the members 
demanded that Czechoslovakia reimpose censorship and curb the changes 
Later   that month, virtually   the entire Soviet politburo came to 
Czechoslovakia to counsel and warn. When the Czechoslovak leadership rejected 
the advice, the Soviet Union led an "allied socialist" invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
and 750,000 troops from the Warsaw Pact crossed into the country on the night 
of August 20-21. Dubcek and the reformers had pushed liberalism and 
nationalism too far. Dubcek was retired from the party and replaced by Gustav 
Husak, who began a process of "normalization" of Czechoslovakia. The Prague 
Spring was over. 
 
Poland's Comradeship and Shared Aims  
 A month after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet 
Communist party daily Pravda elliptically justified the invasion by invoking a 
principle dubbed in the West as the Brezhnev Doctrine, named after party leader 
Leonid Brezhnev. Pravda reaffirmed the principle of many roads to socialism 
but insisted that no action in any socialist country should do harm either to 
socialism" in the country involved "or to the fundamental interests of other 
socialist countries. This means that each communist party is responsible not 
only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire 
communist movement."[12] In effect Kremlin was claiming the right to 
intervene in any country in the block to prevent counterrevolution or the 
deterioration of communist Party Control. Thus, the Brezhnev Doctrine is also 
sometimes referred to as the doctrine of limited sovereignty": The sovereignty 
of the East European states was limited by their obligations to others in the 
socialist camp. Brezhnev Set of guidelines cast a pall over there in Eastern 
Europe for the next decade, but it did not deter the Poles from periodic bouts of 
strikes and unrest. Indeed, Poland had a tradition of revolt, often against the 
Russians, that dated back to the eighteenth-century era of the Partitions when 
the Polish state was gobbled up by its three powerful neighbors, Russia, 
Prussia and Austria. This tradition continued even after the consolidation of 
communist power. In 1956, as we have seen above, demonstrations and riots 
affected the transfer of party leadership to Wladyslaw Gomulka. In 1968, 
students and professors staged huge demonstrations following the regime’s 
closing of a performance of a nineteenth-century play that contained the line: 
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"The only things Moscow sends us are jackasses, idiots and spies.”[13] One of 
the slogans during the student demonstrations was the rhyming "Polska czeka 
na swego Dubczeka" Poland is waiting for its own Dubcek. 
 The 1968 demonstrations were met with harsh reprisals and purges of 
students and professors, especially those of Jewish origin. In 1970, the initiative 
returned to the workers, this time in the port cities of Gdansk and Szczecin who 
mounted demonstrations against a Christmastime increase in food prices. 
Gomulka fell from power the same way he had raised, on the basis of 
popular unrest, and Edward Gierek replaced him as party leader. Gierek 
rescinded the price increases, but when the regime tried to raise them again 
in 1976 they were met by another round of strikes and demonstrations. 
The 1976 strikes and the subsequent crackdown by the authorities, brought 
workers and intellectuals into an alliance for the first time with the 
formation by the latter of KOR(Komitet Obrony Robotników), the Workers' 
Defense Committee. In 1978, a small group of workers in the shipyards 
along the coast illegally formed a Committee of Free Trade Unions for the 
Baltic Coast. One of the founding members was a shipyard electrician named 
Lech Walesa. In October of the same year, Karol Wojtyla of Krakow was 
elected pope of the Roman Catholic Church, taking the name John Paul II. On 
his triumphal visit to Poland the next year, he was welcomed by millions of 
Poles and gave them a sense of both hope and power. As a result, the stage 
was set for an even more powerful challenge to the regime. The spark came 
in July 1980 with yet another effort by the regime to raise retail food prices 
(which by this time were considerably below the cost of producing the 
product, requiring huge government subsidies). Strikes spread throughout 
the country, eventually centering on the coast again. By mid-August, 16,000 
workers were on strike at the huge Lenin Shipyards in Gdansk. Lech Walesa 
assumed the leadership of that strike committee and then of the Interfactory 
Strike Committee (Międzyzakładowy Komitet Strajkowy, MKS), which 
represented and coordinated the strike activity at over two hundred en-
terprises. 
 When a politburo delegation from Warsaw arrived to negotiate, the 
MKS (Międzyzakładowy Komitet Strajkowy) presented them with a list of 
twenty-one demands, the first of which was "acceptance of Free Trade 
Unions independent of both the Party and the employers." After two weeks 
of negotiations inside the Lenin Shipyards, the government finally agreed 
to virtually all of the demands. Thus the government sanctioned the 
creation of the first independent trade union in the communist world, 
which the workers named Solidarity. 
 Over the next sixteen months, some twelve million people (out of a 
total work force of sixteen million) joined Solidarity or its rural affiliate. With 
this practically universal support, the organization became more and more 
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powerful and increasingly challenged the political prerogatives of the party. 
At the same time, the party (the Polish United Workers' party) grew 
weaker and more indecisive as hundreds of thousands of members resigned, 
and another million joined Solidarity as well. [14] The weakening of the 
Polish party raised hackles in the Kremlin. Several times in 1980 and 1981, 
the Soviets staged threatening military maneuvers along the Polish borders. 
After the September 1981 Congress of Solidarity, the Kremlin described the 
session as an "anti-socialist and anti-Soviet orgy." In an ominous hint of 
things to come, in October General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who was already 
prime minister and defense minister, replaced the Polish party leader, 
Stanislaw Kania. Finally, under pressure from the Kremlin, on December 13 
Jaruzelski declared martial law, arrested the Solidarity leadership, and 
banned the union. 
 
Structure's Accomplishment and Putrefaction 
 Though the Brezhnev Doctrine was not explicitly invoked in the 
Polish case, the crushing of Solidarity was a reaffirmation of the unwillingness 
of the Soviet leadership to tolerate the erosion of communist authority in 
Eastern Europe. But in Poland   the   results   were   different   from   those   
in   Hungary   or Czechoslovakia. In the first place, the Soviet army had not 
intervened directly, apparently fearing massive national resistance to the use of 
Soviet troops. Second, the martial law abolition of Solidarity was not entirely 
effective. The union was reconstituted as an underground organization and 
continued its activities in organizing strikes and demonstrations, publishing 
newsletters, and promoting independent initiatives in all spheres of society. 
What was most important, however, was the simple legacy of; Solidarity. 
Adam Michnik, a founding member of KOR and Solidarity: adviser 
characterized it as follows: 
 In 1980 the totalitarian state gave in and signed an agreement, which 
allowed for the existence of the first legal and independent institutions of 
postwar Polish political life. They lasted but a short time; long enough, 
however, to convince everyone that after December 1981 it was not 
possible to speak again about "socialism with a human face." What 
remains is communism with its teeth knocked out. [15] 
 Western economists have found it difficult to estimate economic 
growth in the communist countries, complaining of unreliable data and 
varying degrees of exaggeration by the state agencies that collect such data. 
Nevertheless, by most measures, the centrally planned economies of Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union delivered hefty overall growth rates through the 
1950s and most of the 1960s. Eastern Europe did not fare badly in a 
comparison of growth rates and standards of living with other countries in 
Europe, especially southern Europe. However, by the late 1960s and early 
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1970s, Eastern European growth rates began to decline, and their economies 
fell further and further behind the market economies of the West. The change 
became particularly evident in the 1970s. 
 There are numerous reasons for these reversals. The international 
environment and economic policies pursued in the 1950s were no longer via-
ble or possible by the 1970s. The economist Paul Marer describes the 1950s in 
the following way: "The authorities mobilized unemployed and under-
employed labor and other resources, increased investment in human and 
physical capital at a rapid pace, and got the resources needed to finance these 
activities by imposing a high rate of forced saving on the population and by 
neglecting infrastructure [i.e., transportation and communications, like 
roads and telephone systems]."[16] Resources were directed toward areas 
like heavy industry (steel, coal, machine building, and so on) that were not 
highly developed before the war, so the percentage growth rates were very 
large. The regimes also spent much more on investment in such industries 
than in the production or import of consumer goods. 
 By the 1960s, this policy of "forced industrialization" became increas-
ingly difficult. The cheap resources, both human and physical, had been 
largely depleted by then; it became harder, for example, to move people 
from the countryside into the cities once collectivization was completed and 
the cities were becoming overcrowded. Furthermore, the Eastern European 
populations became increasingly dissatisfied with the political and social 
restrictions associated with forced industrialization and with the scarcity 
and poor quality of consumer goods. 
 During the 1960s and 1970s, these problems were held at bay by 
several different circumstances. First, most of the Eastern European countries 
did attempt some kind of decentralizing economic reforms, following the 
lead of the Kremlin's experimentation with its own "Liberman". 
Reforms (named after the Soviet economist who first proposed them). 
Most of these reforms had some success in the short run. Second, the 
domestic economic problems of the Eastern European states were partially 
offset by increasing trade with the Soviet Union, which allowed them to 
import relatively cheap energy and raw materials from the Soviet Union and 
to sell to that country their own relatively low-quality manufactured 
goods, which were often not competitive in Western markets. Finally, during 
the 1970s Eastern Europe experienced a new source of growth through in-
creased trade with the West, often financed by generous Western credit. [17] 
 By the late 1970s and early 1980s, all of these safety valves began 
to close up. The economic reform programs encountered resistance from 
bureaucrats and managers and were often ineffectual without a more 
thorough overhaul of the political and economic systems which, as 
evidenced in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980, 
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was not possible. The favorable terms of trade with the Soviet Union began 
to reverse in the late 1970s. As the Soviet Union experienced its own 
economic problems, the Kremlin became increasingly reluctant to subsidize 
the Eastern European economies; Soviet energy prices rose toward world 
market levels, and Moscow increasingly insisted on payment in 
convertible (Western) currencies. [18] Furthermore, world market prices for 
oil jumped dramatically after the 1973 Middle East conflict, impeding eco-
nomic growth in West and East alike. Finally, during the 1980s, Western 
credit began to dry up as it became clear that the Eastern European gov-
ernments were not able to repay the large amounts they had borrowed in the 
1970s. 
 
The Erosion of Political Authenticity 
 Thus by the 1980s, the cost-cutting measures of the entire of the 
Eastern European states not excluding Soviet Union were in serious trouble. 
GNP growth rates had declined to near zero. External debts were so large 
that the governments often had to spend all of their export earnings just to 
finance the debts. With the collapse of foreign credits, highly valued 
Western consumer goods could no longer be imported. The centrally 
planned economies, which were well equipped to generate rapid growth in 
heavy industry, were not able to generate growth in more sophisticated 
sectors of the economy: services, consumer goods, and high technology. To 
complicate matters, consumers had come to expect high levels of growth and 
were ill prepared to endure the sacrifices associated with meaningful 
economic reforms. 
 All governments, democratic or authoritarian, employ some means 
to establish their legitimacy in the eyes of the population, and they reinforce 
this legitimacy through the political socialization process (civic education in 
schools, and so on). No regime can be based entirely on the threat or 
application of force. In the communist party states of Eastern Europe, 
political legitimacy was built on three main pillars: the communist 
ideology! Widespread (if largely formal) participation and socioeconomic 
performance. In the early postwar years, all three of these were at work, 
though they did not nil work with all sectors of the population. As 
indicated above, there was considerable support for the ideas of 
communism (or at least, of socialism) throughout the region, and 
particularly in certain] countries (like Bulgaria). The new communist 
governments were also able! to gain some credibility by involving people in 
the political process through voting (usually with a 98+ percent turnout), 
through service in local elected bodies, and through participation in 
socioeconomic organizations, such as youth groups and trade unions. All of 
this participation was controlled and regulated by the communist parties 
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but, nevertheless, gave many people a feeling that they had a stake and a 
voice in the system. Finally, the early socioeconomic successes of the 
Eastern European regimes also contributed to their political legitimacy. As 
we have seen, these countries experienced rapid economic growth in the 
1950s and some! Improvement in the standard of living, especially in the 
1960s and 1970s. The governments were able to deliver jobs, health care, 
and education to the entire populations of their countries. Furthermore, 
there were very high rates of social mobility within each country, meaning 
that many people were able to move up the social or economic scale. All of 
this created a| sense of progress and development. 
 One by one, however, these sources of political legitimacy began 
to wither away. Most people became inured to the omnipresent political slogans 
and increasingly disgusted with communist political systems and societies 
that did not live up to the ideals of Karl Marx, or even of Lenin. Critics, such as 
Yugoslavia's Milovan Djilas, saw in the communist party Apparatus a kind of 
"new class" that simply replaced the dominant classes from the pre-communist 
period. [19] The widespread participation that had been encouraged by the new 
regimes now came to be seen as both hollow and coerced. More and more 
people began to turn away from politics altogether. (In the Soviet city of Rostov-
on-Don in 1978, I once asked a Soviet friend, a young mother, what she thought 
of Leonid Brezhnev, the party leader at the time, whose image was displayed 
on a huge billboard where we were walking. "I don't think anything about 
him," she replied.)  
 Increasingly the political legitimacy of the regimes in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union came to rest on their socioeconomic accomplishments. 
Some scholars, both in the West and in Eastern Europe, argued that there existed 
a kind of "social contract" or "social compact" between the governments and 
the populace, in which the former delivered economic goods and growth and, 
in return, the population tacitly agreed to leave politics to the politicians. [20] 
But as the economies began to deteriorate and the opportunities for social 
advancement began to narrow, even this source of legitimacy disappeared. 
In capitalist democracies of the West, the government is not always held 
responsible for economic slowdowns, which are often seen as an inevitable 
consequence of the market. In state socialist societies, however, because the 
government controls the economy, the government gets the blame when the 
economy falters. Public opinion polls from the region in the 1980s show 
increased popular disaffection with the economies, the governments, and the 
ideologies. An analysis of such surveys in Poland, for example, concluded that 
only about a quarter of the population could be counted as "pro" regime. [21] 
 After Soviet intervention to terminate the Prague Spring in 1968 and: 
the crushing of Poland's Solidarity in 1981, the fragile political legitimacy of the 
communist regimes crumbled even further. As their governments' relationships 
European Scientific Journal July 2015 edition vol.11, No.20  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
286 
to Moscow was increasingly seen by the populations as a liability, some of the 
party leaders in Eastern Europe replaced the emphasis on "socialist 
internationalism" with an appeal to "socialist patriotism." It was hoped this 
would win some popular support by stressing national interests and national 
autonomy. The Polish party leader Jaruzelski, for example, used this tactic after 
the crushing of Solidarity. A 1976 Berlin conference of communist parties 
implicitly sanctioned this approach by allowing for "indigenous, creative 
interpretations" of Marxism-Leninism.  
 In the past, when the Eastern European communist parties experienced a 
serious loss of legitimacy, they could count on the Soviet Union for outside 
support, providing another, external source of legitimacy. But with the 
accession of Mikhail Gorbachev to the Soviet leadership in 1985, even this 
external legitimation began to dry up. As the Gorbachev leadership began 
to reform the Soviet system, it called on the Eastern European party leaders to 
do the same in their countries. Additionally, Gorbachev made it increasingly 
clear that the Soviet Union would no longer use the military to intervene in 
Eastern Europe (or elsewhere). With the Eastern European communist 
leaderships no longer able to play the Kremlin card, the communist party 
states were doomed. 
 
The Inflammation of Dissent 
 In the 1980s, mass protests shook the regimes of Eastern Europe. 
The roots of protest and dissent, however, went back a decade or more in 
most of the region. As the economies and the regimes began to weaken in 
the 1970s, these dissident groups became more active, more visible, and 
more popular. In the Soviet Union, dissidence had been crushed under 
Lenin and Stalin and had reappeared only briefly and weakly under 
Khrushchev. The revival of political dissent in the 1970s was due in large 
part to the Soviet signature of the Helsinki Agreements in 1975. These 
credentials (sometimes referred to as the Helsinki Accords), a result of a 
long process of negotiations among thirty-five states in Europe, plus the 
United States and Canada, contained a whole section on "respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought 
conscience, religion or belief."[22] The Soviet signature of these agreements 
stimulated a group of dissident intellectuals in the Soviet Union to form a 
Helsinki Monitoring Committee to publicize (in underground 
publications called samizdat,) Soviet violations of the human rights they 
had guaranteed in Helsinki. Most of these activists (including the physicist 
Andrei Sakharov) were arrested or exiled, but they laid the groundwork for 
more substantial dissent in the 1980s. 
 In Eastern Europe, dissent was always stronger and more sustained 
than in the Soviet Union, for a number of reasons: the shorter time period 
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under Stalinism; the greater experience with democracy before World War 
II and the less draconian political regimes. [23] Nevertheless, political dissent 
was largely confined to a relatively small group of intellectuals in each 
country, only rarely taking the form of workers' protests or strikes. As in the 
Soviet Union, the dissident movement was given a boost by the 1975 
Helsinki Accords, which led to the formation of various kinds of human 
rights monitoring groups in Eastern Europe as well. The largest dissident 
movement developed in Poland, especially after; the formation of KOR, the 
Workers' Defense Committee, established by intellectuals to provide legal 
and material assistance to the families of workers imprisoned after the 1976 
strikes. The success of KOR led the organization to expand its mission and 
to change its name the next year to KOR-KSS (the Committee for Social 
Self-Defense). The next several years saw the formation of the Movement for 
the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO in the Polish acronym), a 
Polish chapter of Amnesty International, the nationalist Confederation of 
Independent Poland (KPN), and incipient Free Trade Union movement. All 
of these organizations produced their own samizdat publications, which 
frequently reported cases of political arrests and the regime's violations of 
the country's constitution or international covenants on human rights. In the 
mid-1980s, there were over 2,000 regular samizdat publications in Poland, 
some printed in tens of thousands of copies. 
 In Czechoslovakia, a group of intellectuals circulated a document 
entitled Charter 77, which called on people to speak out on behalf of human 
rights guaranteed by Czechoslovak laws and the Helsinki Accords. The 
playwright Vaclav Havel became the spokesman for the signatories of the 
charter, who later became the core of the Civic Forum that brought down 
the communist government in 1989. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, dissident 
organizations were not as well organized, but there were often alternative 
channels for expression of dissent, either through samizdat (as in Hungary) 
or through the churches. In East Germany, for example, the Evangelical 
church served as an umbrella for the unofficial peace movement, which also 
harbored dissidents in the democratic and ecological movements. According 
to political scientist Robert Sharlet, who has written frequently about the 
dissident movements in Eastern Europe, political dissent served three key 
functions. First, dissidents who spoke out, especially through samizdat, 
helped break "the bonds of fear that immobilize the individual" and therefore 
served as role models for others. Second, the samizdat network broke the 
regime's monopoly on information, establishing an "alternative, unofficial 
communication system." Finally, political dissent in the controlled political 
environments of Eastern Europe led to the "gradual reprivatization of social 
life," carving out a growing sphere of activity independent of state control. 
European Scientific Journal July 2015 edition vol.11, No.20  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
288 
This is part of the notion of a "civil society," which became an important 
concept in challenging the state. [24] 
 
The Thoughts of Municipal Society and Central Europe 
 One cannot overemphasize the power of ideas, particularly in 
Central Europe. Marx argued that ideas are simply part of the 
"superstructure" of society and therefore have no independent determining 
force; they are simply functions of the underlying economic "substructure." 
It is perhaps ironic, then, that in the Marxist societies of Eastern Europe, 
powerful ideas helped to undermine and subvert the system. Often these 
ideas were developed and discussed by a relatively small number of 
intellectuals; nevertheless, these concepts subsequently became part of the 
culture of change. The most important concepts concerned civil society 
and Central Europe, and the two are related. [25] 
 Different groups and intellectuals used the notion of a civil society in 
different ways, but the basic notion is that people can and should try to live 
as much as possible outside of the official structures and patterns sponsored 
by the communist authorities. This could take the form, for example, of 
producing and reading samizdat, buying or trading goods in the second 
economy (the black market or the private market), participating in 
informal self-educational groups (such as the Flying University set up in 
Poland in the 1970s), and supporting those few organizations, like some 
churches, that were not controlled by the political authorities. In pursuing 
these kinds of independent activities, the population would help to create an 
"alternative society" or a "second society" that was beyond the reach of the 
authorities. As this civil society grew, the power of the state would weaken. 
Eventually, the official structures would simply disappear and be replaced 
by the civil society. 
 The advocates of civil society generally called for people not to 
participate in the official political system and even to ignore it. This idea was 
developed by Czechoslovakia's Vaclav Havel in his important 1979 essay, 
"The Power of the Powerless”, which was later published as a book.[26] 
Havel contends that the totalitarian political system is built on lies and that 
people allow the system to exist by accepting the lies and living within 
them. So the only appropriate response is for the individual to reject the lies: 
"He rejects the ritual and breaks the rules of the game. He discovers once 
more his suppressed identity and dignity. He gives his freedom a tangible 
and concrete significant worth. The chronological order tells that his 
revolt is an attempt to live within the truth."[27] This entails not just 
speaking the truth and rejecting the official lies (including the ideology), 
but living independently of official structures and norms and participating 
in parallel structures constituted independently of the official ones. The 
European Scientific Journal July 2015 edition vol.11, No.20  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
289 
more people who do this, the greater the erosion of state power. Along the 
same lines, the Polish dissident Adam Michnik called for a strategy of 
"social self-organization" or "social self-defense."[28] Michnik was one of 
the founders of KOR that pursued precisely this goal. The Czechoslovak 
Vaclav Benda used similar arguments in his 1978 essay en titled "The 
Parallel Polls." The Hungarian philosopher Gyorgy Konrad goes even 
further in his book Antipolitics, arguing that all power is antihuman, and 
therefore so is all politics. [29] Not all of these writers explicitly used the 
term civil society, but all of them had the same concept in mind. Discussions 
of these ideas were circulated widely through samizdat, both within and 
among countries. There was considerable cross-fertilization of ideas among 
the writers in the different countries. And the appeals struck a chord with 
the people, who were already feeling resentful, frustrated, and apathetic. 
 Many of the intellectuals who developed the concept of civil society 
linked it to the notion of "Central Europe," contending, as Gyorgy 
Konrad did, that "the demand for self-government is the organizing force of 
the new Central European ideology." [30] Konrad, Havel, and others began to 
employ the term Central Europe following the publication in 1983 of an 
important essay by the Czechoslovak writer Milan Kundera entitled "The 
Tragedy of Central Europe."[31] In this essay, Kundera argued that 
culturally and spiritually, the peoples in East-Central Europe more properly 
belonged to the West than to the East and that it was only because the region 
was "kidnapped, displaced and brainwashed" after World War II that it was 
consigned to "East Europe." Historically, he argued, Europe was always 
divided into two halves, one tied to Rome and the Catholic Church and the 
other to Byzantium and the Orthodox Church. "After 1945," he wrote, "the 
border between the two Europe’s shifted several hundred kilometers to the 
west, and several nations that had always considered themselves to be Western 
woke up to discover that they were now in the East."  
 Kundera's argument, like those for civil society, had widespread 
appeal in the region. It relegated politics to the sidelines and elevated the 
importance of culture in Central Europe's identity. As such, it suggested that the 
peoples of the region could find identity, affirmation, and autonomy in culture 
and could do so without bowing to politics. It was another means of "living 
the truth." Furthermore, in Kundera's argument at least, the peoples of Central 
Europe were not to blame for their fate; it was the fault both of Russia, a non-
European state that "kidnapped" the region, and of the West for forsaking 
Central Europe (reverberations of Yalta) and do not taking into account its own 
cultural identity. 
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Conclusion 
 This research paper however investigates that the conception and 
perception of East-Central Europe provided both optimism and self-esteem 
to scores of people in the region and constituted yet another node in the 
network of challenges to the communist system. There was, nonetheless, a 
darker underside to the ideas and the history of Central Europe. The cultural 
legacy that, the writers and artists of prewar Central Europe, did help to shape 
the national and cultural identity of those states. But nationalism is two-edged: 
It can be a positive force for unity and common purpose; but it can also be 
intolerant and exclusivist. There are hints of this in Kundera's essay, which is 
anti-Soviet but also anti-Russian. Similarly, the cultural and political history 
of Central Europe may be rich and cosmopolitan, but it is also full of radical 
nationalism (i.e., Nazism), anti-Semitism (hostility toward Jews), and racism. 
So a revival of a Central European culture has the potential both to unite 
Eastern Europe with Western Europe and to divide Eastern Europeans from 
each other. 
 The research also sees the sights that the effects of the 
anticommunist revolution were felt not just in the United States. Europe was 
being reshaped as thoroughly as it had been after W W-2, and perhaps as 
dramatically as after WW-I in the aftermath of the dissolution of the 
Austrian, German, Russian, and Ottoman empires. The collapse of the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), the Eastern European Military 
Alliance (otherwise known as the Warsaw Pact), called into question the 
character and rationale of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
the Western alliance. The unification of Germany fashioned a hefty new-
fangled European supremacy that could dominate Europe economically, 
politically, and perhaps even militarily. The new democratic states in East-
Central Europe aspired to association in the European Community (EC) at the 
same time that the EC was moving en route for closer internal integration. 
New monetary and political alliances formed surrounded by the East-Central 
European states and stuck between them and the Western European ones. 
Europe became fluid. 
 It is also part of the culminating point of this research that how rapidly 
communism was established and time-honored in Eastern Europe and how 
quickly it began to erode and corrode. Joseph Stalin on one occasion admitted 
that "communism fits Poland like a saddle fits a cow and this was true in varying 
degrees all over Eastern Europe. It is fruitless, however, to assign blame for this 
state of affairs, as is done both by Western historian of the Cold War and by 
Eastern European intellectuals. The actuality was that the Soviet Union was in 
control of Eastern Europe as a result of WW-2 military operations and was 
bound to establish Soviet-style governments in that area. After the war, 
Western Europe was prostrate and unable to help Eastern Europe. The 
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United States was absorbed enough with the rebuilding of Western Europe 
and was unwilling to confront the Soviet Union in its own sphere of 
influence and sway, particularly if there was a risk of a major war over the 
issue. The only Eastern European countries those were able to distance 
themselves from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Albania, had not been 
"liberated" by Soviet forces during the war, did not share borders with the 
USSR, and were outside of that country's area of central strategic concern. 
 Nevertheless, at any rate, Eastern European World solved the 
problem on its own and with almost no violent behavior bloodshed. It has no 
doubt been a vivid and incontrovertible truth that the Cold War that 
ultimately triggered the then USSR towards its disintegration began in 
Eastern Europe, and it ended there. An individual undoubtedly could have 
words that the West stood triumphant and victorious in the Cold War devoid 
of resorting to a hot war, simply by waiting for the inevitable. It was very 
unambiguous by the late 1940s, with the Tito-Stalin rupture, that the 
imposition of Soviet-style communism in Eastern Europe was not going to 
be an unproblematic. Despite the strict political controls, censorship of the 
media, intense political socialization, and restrictions on contacts with the 
West, Eastern and Central Europe on no account looked like the Soviet 
Union, at the same time any visitor to the two planets could attest this fact. The 
intermittent and sporadic turbulence in the region, often having a drastic 
need of Soviet intervention, demonstrated how thin the veneer of the 
legitimacy of the communist party regimes was. 
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